The Choice Between Joint Ventures and Acquisitions: Insights from Signaling Theory

Jeffrey J. Reuer () and Roberto Ragozzino ()
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Jeffrey J. Reuer: Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
Roberto Ragozzino: School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080

Organization Science, 2012, vol. 23, issue 4, 1175-1190

Abstract: This paper extends information economics in corporate strategy and organizational governance research by using signaling theory to explain firms' market entry modes. We exploit features of the initial public offering (IPO) context to investigate how signals on newly public firms shape other companies' governance choices to form joint ventures with them versus acquiring them. We also develop theoretical arguments on how the value of these signals will vary across exchange partners. The results reveal that companies are more apt to acquire, versus partner with, IPO firms taken public by reputable investment banks compared with IPO firms associated with less prominent underwriters. Venture capitalist backing also appears to be a valuable signal for prospective acquirers, particularly when the acquirer and target reside in different industries and possess dissimilar knowledge bases. We also present evidence that signals affect target selection and the emergence of market segmentation for joint venture partners and acquisition candidates.

Keywords: signaling theory; joint ventures; alliances; acquisitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:23:y:2012:i:4:p:1175-1190

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