Supervising Across Borders: The Case of Multinational Hierarchies

Yue Maggie Zhou ()
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Yue Maggie Zhou: Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109

Organization Science, 2015, vol. 26, issue 1, 277-292

Abstract: This paper examines how multinational corporations (MNCs) selectively assign supervisory responsibilities to units in countries with varying levels of institutional quality. Arbitraging across institutional contexts is an important function of MNCs, but it also creates coordination challenges. The choice of organization structure, such as the differential assignment of supervisory responsibilities, is an important tool for managing these coordination challenges. Using data on the business activities and supervision relationships within U.S. multinational manufacturers in 1996–2008, I find that frontline subsidiaries in countries with weaker institutions are more likely to be supervised by foreign rather than domestic supervisory units. Foreign supervision is even more likely when subsidiaries in weak-institution countries conduct activities that are more central to or interdependent with their parents’ global operations. These findings confirm that MNCs use differential supervision to enhance global coordination. The paper highlights one of the most unique features of MNCs: a multinational hierarchy that resides within a firm’s boundary but across national borders. It also connects MNCs’ hierarchical structure with institutional imperfections that give rise to the emergence of the firm in the first place.

Keywords: organization structure; coordination; delegation; institutions; multinational corporations; global strategy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:26:y:2015:i:1:p:277-292

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