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Labor Market Advantages of Organizational Status: A Study of Lateral Partner Hiring by Large U.S. Law Firms

Christopher I. Rider () and David Tan ()
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Christopher I. Rider: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057
David Tan: Foster School of Business, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195

Organization Science, 2015, vol. 26, issue 2, 356-372

Abstract: Prior research demonstrates product market advantages of organizational status but largely neglects factor market advantages. We propose that status is advantageous in labor markets because individuals generally consider employer status a nonpecuniary employment benefit. Dyadic analyses of lateral partner hiring by large U.S. law firms demonstrate two status-based advantages in employee hiring and retention. First, high-status firms are more likely than low-status ones to hire an employee from a more profitable competitor. Second, high-status firms are most likely to lose an employee to a lower-status competitor when the competitor is—atypically—more profitable. We discuss implications of these findings for individual and organizational status attainment and for the stability of industry status hierarchies.

Keywords: organizational status; labor markets; hiring; mobility; law firms; employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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