Category Signaling and Reputation

Giacomo Negro (), Michael T. Hannan () and Magali Fassiotto ()
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Giacomo Negro: Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia 30322
Michael T. Hannan: Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305
Magali Fassiotto: Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Organization Science, 2015, vol. 26, issue 2, 584-600

Abstract: We propose that category membership can operate as a collective market signal for quality when low-quality producers face higher costs of gaining membership. The strength of membership as a collective signal increases with the sharpness of the category boundary, that is, contrast . Our empirical study focuses on biodynamic and organic viticulture in Alsace.

Keywords: sociology of markets; organization theory; signaling; reputation; categories; wine industry; Alsace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:26:y:2015:i:2:p:584-600

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