Adverse Effects of CEO Family-to-Work Conflict on Firm Performance

Christopher S. Reina (), Suzanne J. Peterson () and Zhen Zhang ()
Additional contact information
Christopher S. Reina: Department of Management, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia 23284
Suzanne J. Peterson: Thunderbird School of Global Management, Arizona State University, Glendale, Arizona 85306
Zhen Zhang: Department of Management and Entrepreneurship, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona 85287

Organization Science, 2017, vol. 28, issue 2, 228-243

Abstract: We examine whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) experiences occurring outside the work domain influence the performance of their respective firms. We suggest that the family-to-work conflict (FWC) that CEOs experience depletes their ability to self-regulate, thereby reducing their ability to make appropriately comprehensive decisions for their firms. This reduced decision-making comprehensiveness, in turn, has negative implications for firm performance. We further propose that CEOs’ levels of job engagement, or the extent to which they invest themselves in their work, can expand their capacity to withstand the negative effects of self-regulatory depletion. We test our hypotheses using a sample of 98 CEOs from the United States computer software and hardware industry. Findings confirm that reduced decision-making comprehensiveness represents one mechanism by which the experience of FWC in CEOs harms the performance of their firms. Moreover, CEO job engagement buffers both the negative effect of CEO FWC on decision-making comprehensiveness and the strength of the indirect relationship between FWC and firm performance via decision-making comprehensiveness.

Keywords: CEO family-to-work conflict; CEO decision making; firm performance; CEO job engagement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2017.1114 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:28:y:2017:i:2:p:228-243

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Organization Science from INFORMS Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Asher ().