Women Don’t Mean Business? Gender Penalty in Board Composition

Isabelle Solal () and Kaisa Snellman
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Isabelle Solal: Organisational Behaviour, INSEAD, 77305 Fontainebleau, France

Organization Science, 2019, vol. 30, issue 6, 1270-1288

Abstract: We examine investor responses to board diversity and highlight a previously unexplored mechanism to explain negative market reactions to senior female appointments. Drawing on signaling theory, we propose that an increase in board diversity leads investors to update their beliefs about firm preferences. Specifically, we argue that a gender-diverse board is interpreted as revealing a preference for diversity and a weaker commitment to shareholder value. Consequently, firms with more female directors will be penalized. We test our argument using 14 years of panel data on U.S. public firms. We find that firms that increase board diversity suffer a decrease in market value and that this effect is amplified for firms that have received higher ratings for their diversity practices across the organization. These results suggest that observers respond to the presence of female leaders not simply on their own merit but as broader cues of firm preferences and that firms may counteract any potential signaling effect through careful framing.

Keywords: diversity; gender; corporate boards; financial markets; shareholder value; social performance; market signals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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