Hybrid Administrative Interfaces: Authority Delegation and Reversion in Strategic Alliances

Marvin Hanisch (), Jeffrey J. Reuer (), Carolin Haeussler () and Shivaram V. Devarakonda ()
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Marvin Hanisch: Department of Innovation Management & Strategy, University of Groningen, 9747 AE Groningen, Netherlands; School of Business, Economics and Information Systems, University of Passau, 94032 Passau, Germany
Jeffrey J. Reuer: Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado 80309
Carolin Haeussler: School of Business, Economics and Information Systems, University of Passau, 94032 Passau, Germany
Shivaram V. Devarakonda: Department of Management, Tilburg University, 5037 AB Tilburg, Netherlands
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Carolin Häussler

Organization Science, 2024, vol. 35, issue 2, 550-572

Abstract: Steering committees are pivotal for governing complex collaborations by consensus to facilitate coordination and knowledge sharing. Although consensus-based governance promotes mutuality, it can also cause deadlocks, stalling expeditious decision making. We examine the conditions under which alliance partners delegate decision-making authority to steering committees as well as the conditions under which authority over discordant matters can be relocated to one of the alliance partners. We argue that joint coordination concerns increase the likelihood of authority delegation, whereas the higher costs and stakes associated with decision stalemates provide grounds for authority reversion. Empirical analyses of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry support our arguments. Our paper demonstrates the versatility of contractually defined administrative interfaces in alliance governance, allowing partners to coordinate bilaterally and adapt hierarchically as and when required.

Keywords: alliance governance; administrative control; authority; R&D alliances; steering committee; dispute resolution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:35:y:2024:i:2:p:550-572

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