Difference in Deference: When Competitors Do Not Give in Despite Having Lost

Rodolphe Durand (), Henning Piezunka () and Philipp Reineke ()
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Rodolphe Durand: Sustainability and Organizations Institute, HEC Paris, 78 351 Jouy en Josas, France
Henning Piezunka: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
Philipp Reineke: Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305

Organization Science, 2025, vol. 36, issue 2, 940-966

Abstract: When a contest is decided, the inferior competitor is supposed to defer to the superior opponent. Yet, sometimes the losing actors refuse to give in. We theorize why and when losing actors do not defer—even when they are supposed to. We hypothesize that when the losing actors categorize their relationship with an opponent as rivalrous beyond the current contest and may obtain some contest-specific gains independent of the focal encounter, they will not defer as much as expected. Unique data from Formula One racing prove strong support. Our findings contribute to research on deference as well as on competition and rivalry. Our study also has broader implications as it helps explain when people do not respect social norms while competing—be it for rewards, for promotions, or in elections.

Keywords: deference; status; competition; rivalry; contest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:36:y:2025:i:2:p:940-966

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