Shareholder Activism and the Deterrence Effect of Democratic Politician Shareholders

Mark R. DesJardine (), Wei Shi () and Timothy Werner ()
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Mark R. DesJardine: Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755
Wei Shi: Miami Herbert Business School, University of Miami, Coral Gables, Florida 33146
Timothy Werner: McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78705

Organization Science, 2025, vol. 36, issue 2, 993-1019

Abstract: Firms strategically establish political connections in the hopes of obtaining access to resources and opportunities controlled by the state. However, little is known about benefits that may accrue to firms from ties with politician shareholders. We explore potential spillover benefits of such ties in the context of financially motivated shareholder activism (“financial activism”). Specifically, we examine whether financial activists are deterred from targeting firms owned by Democratic politicians, who tend to adopt a more interventionist and stakeholder-oriented stance toward economic regulation than Republicans. Based upon an analysis of S&P 1500 firms over a 15-year period, we find that the number of Democratic politician shareholders is negatively associated with a firm’s likelihood of being targeted by a financial activist. This relationship is stronger when Democratic politician shareholders are more publicly prominent and when firms have more Democratic-leaning boards. Our study shows that the benefits firms derive from politician shareholders spill over beyond the business-government interface into the domain of corporate governance.

Keywords: corporate governance; nonmarket/political environment; archival research: extant data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:36:y:2025:i:2:p:993-1019

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