Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic “Remedies” for Trust/Distrust

Sim B. Sitkin and Nancy L. Roth
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Sim B. Sitkin: Graduate School of Business, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712
Nancy L. Roth: School of Communication, Information, and Library Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

Organization Science, 1993, vol. 4, issue 3, 367-392

Abstract: Organizations frequently adopt formal rules, contracts, or other legalistic mechanisms when interpersonal trust is lacking. But recent research has shown such legalistic “remedies” for trust-related problems to be ineffective in restoring trust. To explain this apparent ineffectiveness, this paper outlines a theory that distinguishes two dimensions of trust—task-specific reliability and value congruence—and shows how legalistic mechanisms respond only to reliability concerns, while ignoring value-related concerns. Organizational responses to employees with HIV/AIDS are used as a case illustration that supports the theory's major propositions. The paper concludes with an agenda for future research.

Keywords: legalistic organizations; trust; distrust; stigmatization; HIV/AIDS; reliability; value congruence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (118)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ororsc:v:4:y:1993:i:3:p:367-392

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