Incentives and Computing Systems for Team-Based Organizations

Anitesh Barua, C.-H. Sophie Lee and Andrew B. Whinston
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Anitesh Barua: Center for Information Systems Management, Department of Management Science and Information Systems, Graduate School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-1175
C.-H. Sophie Lee: Center for Information Systems Management, Department of Management Science and Information Systems, Graduate School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-1175
Andrew B. Whinston: Center for Information Systems Management, Department of Management Science and Information Systems, Graduate School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712-1175

Organization Science, 1995, vol. 6, issue 4, 487-504

Abstract: Facing increasingly complex tasks involving coordination, communication and interactions among multiple decision makers, organizations are undergoing a transition, experimenting with new forms such as the team-based structure, and investing heavily in network-based computing to support team activities. We take the position that for the new form to succeed, and for computing investments to pay off, the organizational designer must consider complementarity effects between incentives, IS design, and organizational and task characteristics. Since these factors impact group performance through complex interactions, a change in one factor necessitates changes in others. We develop a stylized, analytical model of group/team interactions involving computing support, and study the impact of various design factors and their interactions on group productivity. Key research issues include the choice of a team/group reward structure, the impact of team composition and computing system features on the overall payoff, incentives for monitoring peers and their effect on group output, the time allocation of group members between peer monitoring and task effort, and the effect of task interdependence on monitoring incentives. The theoretical model provides a set of propositions showing how interactions between the chosen reward system, system design features and organizational factors determine members’ behavior (e.g., the extent of free riding and shirking) and subsequently the organizational payoff. These results provide broad qualitative implications for designing incentive schemes and information systems for appropriating maximum organizational value in team-based environments.

Keywords: complementarity; team/group interactions; incentives; information systems design; organizational and task characteristics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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