Two-Player Noncooperative Games over a Freight Transportation Network

Lorenzo Castelli (), Giovanni Longo (), Raffaele Pesenti () and Walter Ukovich ()
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Lorenzo Castelli: DEEI, Università degli Studi di Trieste, via A. Valerio 10, 34127 Trieste, Italy
Giovanni Longo: DIC, Università degli Studi di Trieste, p.le Europa 1, 34127 Trieste, Italy
Walter Ukovich: DEEI, Università degli Studi di Trieste, via A. Valerio 10, 34127 Trieste, Italy

Transportation Science, 2004, vol. 38, issue 2, 149-159

Abstract: A game between two players acting on the same road transportation network is considered in this paper. The first player aims at minimizing the transportation costs, whereas the second player aims at maximizing her profit (or, in general, her utility) that is proportional to the flow passing through the arcs under her control. We introduce bilevel linear programming formulations for this problem. We derive conditions of existence and properties of the equilibrium points and propose an algorithm finding a local optimal solution. Finally, we present an application of the model to a real system involving trucks travelling through Europe from a Middle Eastern country.

Keywords: freight transportation; noncooperative games; networks; bilevel programming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:inm:ortrsc:v:38:y:2004:i:2:p:149-159

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