Efficient markets, managerial power, and CEO compensation

Michael Bognanno

IZA World of Labor, 2014, No 34, 34

Abstract: The escalation in chief executive officer (CEO) pay over recent decades, both in absolute terms and in relation to the earnings of production workers, has generated considerable attention. The pay of top executives has grown noticeably in relation to overall firm profitability. The pay gap between CEOs in the US and those in other developed countries narrowed substantially during the 2000s, making top executive pay an international concern. Researchers have taken positions on both sides of the debate over whether the level of CEO pay is economically justified or is the result of managerial power.

Keywords: top executive pay; CEO compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://wol.iza.org/articles/efficient-markets-mana ... O-compensation-1.pdf (application/pdf)
http://wol.iza.org/articles/efficient-markets-mana ... and-CEO-compensation (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: Efficient markets, managerial power, and CEO compensation (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izawol:journl:y:2014:n:34

Access Statistics for this article

IZA World of Labor is currently edited by Pierre Cahuc

More articles in IZA World of Labor from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) ().