Can hiring subsidies benefit the unemployed?

Alessio Brown

IZA World of Labor, 2015, No 163, 163

Abstract: Long-term unemployment can lead to skill attrition and have detrimental effects on future employment prospects, particularly following periods of economic crises when employment growth is slow and cannot accommodate high levels of unemployment. Addressing this problem requires the use of active labor market policies targeted at the unemployed. In this context, hiring subsidies can provide temporary incentives for firms to hire unemployed workers and, when sensibly targeted, are a very cost-effective and efficient means of reducing unemployment, during both periods of economic stability and recovery.

Keywords: active labor market programs; subsidies; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J23 J24 J38 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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