Unions and investment in intangible capital
Giovanni Sulis ()
IZA World of Labor, 2015, No 201, 201
Although coverage of collective bargaining agreements has been declining for decades in most countries, it is still extensive, especially in non-Anglo-Saxon countries. Strong unions may influence firms’ incentives to invest in capital, particularly in sectors where capital investments are sunk (irreversible), as in research-intensive sectors. Whether unions affect firms’ investment in capital depends on the structure and coordination of bargaining, the preference of unions between wages and employment, the quality of labor-management relations, and the existence of social pacts, among other factors.
Keywords: unions; coverage; collective bargaining; investment; R&D; sunk capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 J52 E22 L60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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