A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Colm O'Riordan ()
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Colm O'Riordan: http://ww2.it.nuigalway.ie/staff/colmor/c.html

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2000, vol. 3, issue 4, 3

Abstract: This paper reports results obtained with a strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. The paper describes a strategy that tries to incorporate a technique to forgive strategies that have defected or retaliated, in the hope of (re-)establishing cooperation. The strategy is compared to well-known strategies in the domain and results presented. The initial findings, as well as echoing past findings, provides evidence to suggest a higher degree of forgiveness can be beneficial and may result in greater rewards.

Keywords: Game Theory; Classical Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma; Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-10-31
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2000-7-1

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