The Integration of Defectors in a Cooperative Setting

Marie-Edith Bissey () and Guido Ortona ()

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2002, vol. 5, issue 2, 2

Abstract: This paper describes a study of the robustness of cooperative conventions. We observe the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the size of the prisonner-dilemma groups and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is considered. We find that the "intelligence" of the players plays a crucial role in the way players learn to cooperate. The simulation program is written in SWARM (Java version).

Keywords: Cooperation; Conventions; Prisoner's Dilemma; Social Simulation; SWARM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03-31
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/2/2.html (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2001-26-2

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation from Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Francesco Renzini ().