My Way or the Highway: a More Naturalistic Model of Altruism Tested in an Iterative Prisoners' Dilemma

David Joyce (), John Kennison (), Owen Densmore (), Stephen Guerin (), Shawn Barr (), Eric Charles and Nicholas S. Thompson ()
Additional contact information
David Joyce: http://aleph0.clarku.edu/~djoyce/
Owen Densmore: http://www.backspaces.net
Stephen Guerin: http://www.redfish.com/about.htm
Nicholas S. Thompson: http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, 4

Abstract: There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of conditional association. On the contrary, TIT FOR TAT implements conditional altruism in the context of unconditionally determined associates. Simulations based on Axelrod's famous tournament have led many to conclude that conditional altruism among unconditional partners lies at the core of much human and animal social behavior. But the results that have been used to support this conclusion are largely artifacts of the structure of the Axelrod tournament, which explicitly disallowed conditional association as a strategy. In this study, we modify the rules of the tournament to permit competition between conditional associates and conditional altruists. We provide evidence that when unconditional altruism is paired with conditional association, a strategy we called MOTH, it can out compete TIT FOR TAT under a wide range of conditions.

Keywords: Game Theory; Altruism; Prisoners' Dilemma; TIT FOR TAT; MOTH; Docking; Netlogo (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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