Segregated Cooperation

Roger Waldeck

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2013, vol. 16, issue 4, 14

Abstract: Observations in experiments show that players in a prisoner's dilemma may adhere more or less to a cooperative norm. Adherence is defined by the intensity of pro-social emotions, like guilt, of deviating from the norm. Players consider also payoffs from defection as a motive to deviate. By combining both incentives, the modeling may explain conditional cooperation and the existence of polymorphic equilibria in which cooperators and defectors coexist. We then show by the use of simulations, that local interaction structures may produce segregation and the appearance of cooperative zones under these conditions.

Keywords: Social Emotions; Norms; Prisoner; Spatial Interaction Structures; Segregation; Agent-Based Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2013-30-3

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