Emergence and Collapse of the Norm of Resource Sharing Around Locally Abundant Resources

Shiro Horiuchi ()
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Shiro Horiuchi: https://horiuchi-shiro.jimdo.com

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2015, vol. 18, issue 4, 7

Abstract: How do individuals resolve conflicts over resources? One way is to share resources, which is possible between known individuals, with the use of sanctions on free riders or by partner selection. Another way is for anonymous individuals to respect the finders’ ownership of resources based on asymmetry and avoid conflicts over resources. This study elucidates the conditions under which anonymous individuals share resources with each other irrespective of their asymmetry with regard to resources. High resource values inhibit anonymous individuals from sharing resources; however, small cumulative values and local distributions let anonymous individuals share the resources. Punishment of the richest individuals also supports resource sharing. These conditions may represent resource sharing among anonymous individuals in periods of great disasters and may be the origin of the practice of exchange in prehistoric times.

Keywords: Agent Based Model; Resources; Norms; Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2015-28-3

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