New Winning Strategies for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

Philippe Mathieu () and Jean-Paul Delahaye ()
Additional contact information
Philippe Mathieu: http://www.lifl.fr/~pmathieu/
Jean-Paul Delahaye: http://www.lifl.fr/~jdelahay/

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, 12

Abstract: In the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game, new successful strategies are regularly proposed especially outperforming the well-known tit_for_tat strategy. New forms of reasoning have also recently been introduced to analyse the game. They lead William Press and Freeman Dyson to a double infinite family of strategies that -theoretically- should all be efficient strategies. In this paper, we study and confront using several experimentations the main strategies introduced since the discovery of tit_for_tat. We make them play against each other in varied and neutral environments. We use the complete classes method that leads us to the formulation of four new simple strategies with surprising results. We present massive experiments using simulators specially developed that allow us to confront up to 6,000 strategies simultaneously, which had never been done before. Our results show without any doubt the most robust strategies among those so far identified. This work defines new systematic, reproductible and objective experiments suggesting several ways to design strategies that go a step further, and a step in the software design technology to highlight efficient strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma and multiagent systems in general.

Keywords: Game Theory; Group Strategy; Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD); Agent Behaviour; Memory; Opponent Identification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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