Violent and Non-Violent Strategies of Counterinsurgency

Anna O. Pechenkina () and D. Scott Bennett ()
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Anna O. Pechenkina: http://sites.google.com/site/annaopechenkina
D. Scott Bennett: http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/d/s/dsb10/

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2017, vol. 20, issue 4, 11

Abstract: Responses to insurgency include both a large-scale societal reform directed at improving the lives of civilians and a direct military response with no additional programs to improve civilian welfare. In this paper, we ask, what is the optimal combination of aid and military response from the viewpoint of the state? Using a computational model, we evaluate what mix of these two strategies helps the government defeat an insurgency more quickly. Our model yields that aid may boost a military strategy that avoids civilian casualties, but it may not compensate for a military strategy that targets civilians indiscriminately.

Keywords: Counterinsurgency; Insurgency; Attrition; Military Approach; Hearts and Minds; Aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2016-186-3

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