The Extortion Relationship: A Computational Analysis

Corinna Elsenbroich () and Jennifer Badham ()

Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 2016, vol. 19, issue 4, 8

Abstract: Systematic extortion involves a long term parasitic relationship between the criminal and the victim. Game theory analysis has provided insight into the choices of individual hypothetical criminal and victim pairs. In this paper we present an agent-based model so as to extend the analysis to the relationship between extorters and other potential victims. The model is developed in two stages, the first to be closest to game theory, the second one making the decision informed by the social environment of the victim. The agent-based model shows the importance of social aspects for the functioning of extortion rackets.

Keywords: Extortion Racketeering; Game Theory; Social Dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-10-31
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jas:jasssj:2016-22-3

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