Analysis on Logistic Contract for FPLs Two-sided Bargaining Game in Agricultural Product Financing

Peng Xu

Business and Management Research, 2016, vol. 5, issue 3, 30-35

Abstract: Agricultural product financing has an important practical significance to expand application scope of inventory financing. However, agricultural products are perishable, seasonal, difficult to transport and storage etc., which requires that agricultural product financing depends on higher level logistic service providers. Therefore, this paper introduces the fourth-party logistics (FPLs) with the ability of resource integration and scheme optimization into the model. Aim to price determination of logistics tasks in agricultural product financing, this paper analyzes the issue between FPLs and banks and TPLs (third-party logistics) under asymmetric information by using Rubinstein bargaining game theory. The study finds that FPLs¡¯ offer is regardless of their own patience, banks¡¯ offer and TPLs¡¯ offer are related to their own cost of competing logistics tasks, and FPLs¡¯ bargaining order will affect their offer.

Date: 2016
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