Mediated (anti)persuasive communication

Zeky Murra-Anton () and Roberto Serrano ()
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Zeky Murra-Anton: ISO New England, USA
Roberto Serrano: Brown University, USA

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2025, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-43

Abstract: Can private information or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the intermediary communicates the private information, the receiver's expected utility improves only under sufficient accuracy of the intermediary's private information, as captured by a positive autarky value of the intermediary's private information (AVIPI). Finally, different classes of equilibria are analyzed to show that the sender's strategic behavior is generally affected by the intermediary's presence as he tries to persuade the intermediary to, in turn, persuade the receiver.

Keywords: Communication; intermediation; Bayesian persuasion. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v10i1a1

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.001

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