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The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design

2016 - 2022

From Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York
Contact information at EDIRC.

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Volume 7, issue 1, 2022

Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications pp. 1-43 Downloads
Oliver J. Board and Kim-Sau Chung
Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach pp. 45-69 Downloads
Péter Csóka and P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Centralized refugee matching mechanisms with hierarchical priority classes pp. 71-111 Downloads
Dilek Sayedahmed
Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited pp. 113-129 Downloads
Krzysztof R. Apt and Jan Heering
A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility pp. 131-150 Downloads
Dimitrios Voliotis

Volume 6, issue 1, 2021

Object-based unawareness: Axioms pp. 1-36 Downloads
Oliver J. Board and Kim-Sau Chung
Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems pp. 37-58 Downloads
Youngsub Chun
A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment pp. 59-100 Downloads
Tobias Reischmann, Thilo Klein and Sven Giegerich
On the degree of distortions under second-degree price discrimination pp. 101-112 Downloads
Ram Orzach and Miron Stano
Dream teams and the Apollo effect pp. 113-148 Downloads
Alex Gershkov and Paul Schweinzer

Volume 5, issue 1, 2020

Implementation with ex post hidden actions pp. 1-35 Downloads
Caleb Koch
On optimal taxes and subsidies: A discrete saddle-point theorem with application to job matching under constraints pp. 37-77 Downloads
Koji Yokote
On a class of linear-state differential games with subgame individually rational and time consistent bargaining solutions pp. 79-97 Downloads
Simon Hoof
Matching with compatibility constraints: The case of the Canadian medical residency match pp. 99-117 Downloads
Muhammad Maaz and Anastasios Papanastasiou
Rights and rents in local commons pp. 119-140 Downloads
Sjur Didrik Flåm

Volume 4, issue 1, 2019

Efficient and Dominance Solvable Auctions with Interdependent Valuations pp. 1-38 Downloads
Kim-Sau Chung and Jeffrey C. Ely
A New Evaluation Criterion for Allocation Mechanisms with Application to Vehicle License Allocations in China pp. 39-86 Downloads
Jianxin Rong, Ning Sun and Dazhong Wang
Pareto Optimal Coalitions of Fixed Size pp. 87-108 Downloads
Ágnes Cseh, Tamás Fleiner and Petra Harján
A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information pp. 109-117 Downloads
Andrés Salamanca Lugo
Loss Aversion in Financial Markets pp. 119-137 Downloads
Liyan Yang

Volume 3, issue 1, 2018

The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited pp. 1-15 Downloads
Anindya Bhattacharya, Victoria Brosi and Francesco Ciardiello
Strategy-Proofness of Stochastic Assignment Mechanisms pp. 17-50 Downloads
André Schmelzer
Efficient Random Assignment with Cardinal and Ordinal Preferences pp. 51-96 Downloads
James Fisher
Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences pp. 97-110 Downloads
Haris Aziz
A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem pp. 111-132 Downloads
Jingang Zhao

Volume 2, issue 1, 2017

On a spontaneous decentralized market process pp. 1-37 Downloads
Satoru Fujishige and Zaifu Yang
Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions pp. 39-55 Downloads
Ola Andersson and Tommy Andersson
Efficiency and fair access in Kindergarten allocation policy design pp. 57-104 Downloads
André Veski, Péter Biró, Kaire Põder and Triin Lauri
On the Partnership formation problem pp. 105-140 Downloads
Akiyoshi Shioura
Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models pp. 141-159 Downloads
Philip R Neary and Jonathan Newton

Volume 1, issue 1, 2016

Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions pp. 1-44 Downloads
Jinpeng Ma and Qiongling Li
School choice under complete information: An experimental study pp. 45-82 Downloads
Yan Chen, Yingzhi Liang and Tayfun Sönmez
On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game pp. 83-107 Downloads
Papatya Duman and Walter Trockel
An ascending multi-item auction with financially constrained bidders pp. 109-149 Downloads
Gerard van der Laan and Zaifu Yang
Discrete convex analysis: A tool for economics and game theory pp. 151-273 Downloads
Kazuo Murota
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