Timing and presentation effects in sequential auctions
Ola Andersson and
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2017, vol. 2, issue 1, 39-55
This paper investigates two hitherto unexplored dimensions inherent in online sequential auctions, namely, how the time elapsed between the end of an auction and the end of the next one and the order of presentation on the website affect prices. Using a state-of-the-art-dataset on train-ticket auctions with a particular institutional design feature that enables a causal interpretation of these dimensions, it is demonstrated that both dimensions have a significant impact on price formation in sequential auctions.
Keywords: Sequential auctions; presentation order; timing afternoon effect. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v7i1a2
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design from Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Schweinzer ().