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Dream teams and the Apollo effect

Alex Gershkov () and Paul Schweinzer
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Alex Gershkov: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel and University of Surrey, UK

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2021, vol. 6, issue 1, 113-148

Abstract: We model leadership selection, competition, and decision making in teams with heterogeneous membership composition. We show that if the choice of leadership in a team is imprecise or noisy--which may arguably be the case if appointment decisions are made by non-expert administrators--then it is not necessarily the case that the best individuals should be selected as team members. On the contrary, and in line with what has been called the "Apollo effect," a "dream team" consisting of unambiguously higher-performing individuals may perform worse in terms of team output than a group composed of lower performers. We characterize the properties of the leadership selection and production processes that lead to the Apollo effect. Finally, we clarify when the opposite effect occurs in which supertalent performs better than comparatively less qualified groups.

Keywords: Team composition; leadership; mistakes. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D70 J80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v006-1/p_05.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Dream Teams and the Apollo Effect (2017) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v6i1a5

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.005

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