A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem

Gian Caspari

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2023, vol. 8, issue 1, 75-96

Abstract: We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A finite set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a finite set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object from each category. We show that, in the large class of category-wise neutral and non-bossy mechanisms, any strategy-proof mechanism can be constructed by simply letting individuals choose an object from each category one after another following some priority order. We refer to these mechanisms as multi-category serial dictatorships and advocate for selecting priority orders across categories as fairly as possible.

Keywords: Matching; envy-free; multi-category housing allocation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v8i1a3

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2023.12.003

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design from Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Schweinzer ().