Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets

Scott Duke Kominers ()
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Scott Duke Kominers: Harvard University and a16z crypto, USA

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2024, vol. 9, issue 1, 83-104

Abstract: One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of the entry comparative static, by way of a well-known property of deferred acceptance called respect for improvements. Our argument extends to yield comparative static results in more general settings, such as matching with slot-specific preferences.

Keywords: Matching; market entry; respect for improvements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a5

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.005

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