The Uncovered Set and the Core: Cox's Result Revisited
Anindya Bhattacharya (),
Victoria Brosi () and
Francesco Ciardiello ()
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Anindya Bhattacharya: University of York, United Kingdom
Francesco Ciardiello: University of Sheffield, United Kingdom
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2018, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-15
In this work first it is shown, in contradiction to the well-known claim in Cox (1987), that the uncovered set in a multidimensional spatial voting situation (under the usual regularity conditions) does not necessarily coincide with the core even when the core is singleton: in particular, the posited coincidence result, while true for an odd number of voters, may cease to be true when the number of voters is even. Second we provide a characterisation result for the case with an even number of voters: a singleton core is the uncovered set in this case if and only if the unique element in the core is the Condorcet winner.
Keywords: Spatial voting games; uncovered set; core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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