Bayesian Bullshit

Sajan Srivastava (), Tymofiy Mylovanov () and Rakesh Vohra ()
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Sajan Srivastava: University of Pennsylvania, USA
Tymofiy Mylovanov: University of Pittsburgh, USA
Rakesh Vohra: University of Pennsylvania, USA

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2024, vol. 9, issue 1, 13-53

Abstract: A bullshitter neither knows nor cares about the truth, and therefore, it has been asserted, is more pernicious than a liar. We examine this assertion within the standard model of cheap talk communication where a bullshitter is modeled as an uninformed Sender. We show that in some circumstances, uncertainty about whether the Sender is informed or not can increase the welfare of the Receiver.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; information design; cheap talk. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C6 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v9i1a3

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2024.12.003

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