A Reexamination of the Coase Theorem

Jingang Zhao

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2018, vol. 3, issue 1, 111-132

Abstract: This paper makes three advances: 1) It fixes the empty-core problem of the Coase theorem; 2) it provides the smallest upper bound of transaction costs below which the optimal or efficient outcomes can be achieved; and 3) it establishes two mathematical theorems that capture the main insights and major aspects of the Coase theorem. A simpler version of the theorems says that in a coalitional production economy without transaction costs, the maximal payoff will be produced by the optimal firms and be allocated in the always non-empty core.

Keywords: Coalition formation; core; optimal firms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D23 L11 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v003-1/p_05.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v3i1a5

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2018.12.005

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design from Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Schweinzer (jmid@mechanism-design.org).