Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations

Joshua S. Gans ()
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Joshua S. Gans: University of Toronto, Canada

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2025, vol. 10, issue 1, 45-65

Abstract: This paper examines whether Catch-22 situations persist as equilibrium phenomena based on Gatekeepers' preferences rather than arbitrary rules. We model a game-theoretic scenario inspired by Heller's paradox, featuring a Requester (either Sane or Insane) who signals before a Gatekeeper decides to grant or deny their request. Our analysis identifies conditions where Catch-22 situations emerge as equilibria and evaluates their efficiency properties. Results demonstrate that such situations can arise naturally as efficient responses by Gatekeepers facing asymmetric information. The model is extended to labor markets, where "experience required for jobs, but jobs required for experience" creates similar dynamics.

Keywords: Catch-22 situation; asymmetric information; dilemmas. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D86 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v10i1a2

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002

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