Axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points in 2-person bargaining problems
Youngsub Chun
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2021, vol. 6, issue 1, 37-58
Abstract:
We consider 2-person bargaining situations in which the feasible set is known, but the disagreement point is uncertain. We investigate the implications of various axioms concerning uncertain disagreement points and characterize the family of linear solutions, which includes the egalitarian, lexicographic egalitarian, Nash, and Kalai-Rosenthal solutions. We also show that how the important subfamilies (or members) of this family can be singled out by imposing additional axioms or strengthening the axioms used in the characterizations.
Keywords: Axiomatic approach to bargaining problems; uncertain disagreement point; linear solutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v6i1a2
DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.002
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