On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Papatya Duman () and Walter Trockel
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Papatya Duman: Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2016, vol. 1, issue 1, 83-107

Abstract: In this paper we provide an exact non-cooperative foundation of the Nash solution via a unique (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium payoff vector in a two-person bargaining game, which is a modification of the well-known alternate offer game by Rubinstein (1982). We also discuss the extent to which our exact and approximate supports of the Nash solution allow an implementation of the Nash solution in (weakly) subgame perfect equilibrium. We show that a sound interpretation as an implementation can only be found in very rare cases where the domains of players’ preferences are extremely restricted.

Keywords: Nash program; non-cooperative foundation; implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v1i1a3

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.003

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