A deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast, and fair childcare assignment
Tobias Reischmann (),
Thilo Klein and
Sven Giegerich ()
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Tobias Reischmann: Department of Information Systems, University of Münster, Germany
Sven Giegerich: Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, UK
The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2021, vol. 6, issue 1, 59-100
Abstract:
We design and implement a program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (DAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster. We provide and evaluate simulation results.
Keywords: Childcare assignment; deferred acceptance algorithm; simulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D02 D47 D82 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v6i1a3
DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2021.12.003
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