A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information

Andrés Salamanca Lugo ()

The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, 2019, vol. 4, issue 1, 109-117

Abstract: Several "value-like" solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility. We will show that the difference between these values is caused by how payoff strategic possibilities of coalitions of the game are handled.

Keywords: Cooperative games; incomplete information; non-transferable utility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v004-1/p_04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information (2018)
Working Paper: A Comparison of NTU Values in a Cooperative Game with Incomplete Information (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v4i1a4

DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2019.11.004

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