The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly

Christopher Coyne and Abigail Hall ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Abigail Blanco ()

Atlantic Economic Journal, 2014, vol. 42, issue 2, 190 pages

Abstract: The U.S. government is the dominant player in the global arms market. Existing literature emphasizes the many benefits of an international U.S. government arms monopoly including: regional and global balance, stability and security, the advancement of U.S. national interests, and domestic economic benefits from international sales. The purpose of this paper is to balance this largely one-sided treatment of the U.S. government’s dominant position in the international arms market. We discuss several negative consequences and costs associated with U.S. arms sales which call into question the net benefit of the U.S. government’s control over global arms. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2014

Keywords: Arms sales; Foreign policy; Monopoly; System effects; D42; D74; F51; F52; H12; H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:42:y:2014:i:2:p:181-190

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DOI: 10.1007/s11293-014-9414-6

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