Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-Value Auctions

Michael Gordy

Computational Economics, 1998, vol. 12, issue 1, 78 pages

Abstract: Although the mathematical foundations of common-value auctions have been well understood since Milgrom and Weber (1982), equilibrium bidding strategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can be found in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paper introduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enough for theoretical and empirical applications, yet permit straightforward calculation of equilibrium bidding strategies. Citation Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Date: 1998
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Working Paper: Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common Value Auctions (2019)
Working Paper: Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions (1997)
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