Computationally convenient distributional assumptions for common value auctions

Michael Gordy

No 1997-5, Finance and Economics Discussion Series from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.)

Abstract: Although the mathematical foundations of common value auctions have been well understood since Milgrom & Weber (1982), equilibrium bidding strategies are computationally complex. Very few calculated examples can be found in the literature, and only for highly specialized cases. This paper introduces two sets of distributional assumptions that are flexible enough for theoretical and empirical applications and yet permit straightforward calculation of equilibrium bidding strategies.

Keywords: Auctions; Econometrics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common Value Auctions (2019)
Journal Article: Computationally Convenient Distributional Assumptions for Common-Value Auctions (1998)
Software Item: MATLAB/C code for GIG and BNLG common value auction specifications (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedgfe:1997-5

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