A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information

Nuno Garoupa and Mohamed Jellal ()

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2002, vol. 14, issue 1, 5-13

Keywords: fine; probability of detection; asymmetry of information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1015677632233

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