An economic approach on countering the misuse of the right to challenge judges: an experiment

Joep Sonnemans (), Frans Dijk, Bart Donders and Eddy Bauw
Additional contact information
Frans Dijk: Netherlands Council for the Judiciary
Bart Donders: University of Amsterdam
Eddy Bauw: Utrecht University

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2018, vol. 45, issue 1, No 2, 29-57

Abstract: Abstract Parties can challenge a judge (request a recusal) when they have reasons to believe that a judge is not impartial. In practice this procedure is sometimes abused by lawyers who, for example, want to delay proceedings. Countries have taken different measures to deter the improper use of the procedure to request a recusal, like fines for dismissed requests, or immediately dismissing evidently unfounded requests. In a laboratory experiment we examine the effects of a summary review whether a challenge is evidently unfounded, with or without fines. We find that a review without fine improves legal protection in practice as well as efficiency by reducing unfounded challenges and increasing challenges that have a substantial chance of success. Overall the number of challenges declines. With a fine, challenges decline, but also legal protection.

Keywords: Challenge judges; Improper use; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-016-9539-y

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