Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts

Claudine Desrieux () and Romain Espinosa
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Claudine Desrieux: CRED - Université Paris II

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2019, vol. 47, issue 1, No 4, 57-88

Abstract: Abstract Using a database on French labor courts between 1998 and 2012, we investigate case selection and judicial decision-making. In France, judges are elected at the labor court level on lists proposed by unions, and litigants can first try to settle their case before the judicial hearing. We show that the ideological composition of the court indirectly impacts the settlement behavior of the parties but has no influence on the decision made in court. In addition, parties have self-fulfilling behavior and adapt to institutional rules. When they anticipate long judicial procedures at court, they settle more frequently and only require judicial hearings for complex cases. The duration to decide these complex cases is longer, explaining why they observe (and build their anticipation on) long case duration. Our empirical strategy uses probit, ordered probit and triprobit estimations to control for case selection.

Keywords: Settlement; Case duration; Judicial proceedings; Labor courts; Unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K31 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-018-9594-7

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