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Case Selection and Judicial Decision-Making: Evidence from French Labor Courts

Claudine Desrieux and Romain Espinosa ()
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Claudine Desrieux: CRED - Centre de Recherches en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas
Romain Espinosa: CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Using a database on French labor courts between 1998 and 2012, we investigate case selection and judicial decision-making. In France, judges are elected at the labor court level on lists proposed by unions, and litigants can first try to settle their case before the judicial hearing. We show that the ideological composition of the court indirectly impacts the settlement behavior of the parties but has no influence on the decision made in court. In addition, parties have self-fulfilling behavior and adapt to institutional rules. When they anticipate long judicial procedures at court, they settle more frequently and only require judicial hearings for complex cases. The duration to decide these complex cases is longer, explaining why they observe (and build their anticipation on) long case duration. Our empirical strategy uses probit, ordered probit and triprobit estimations to control for case selection. JEL codes: K31, K41

Keywords: judicial proceedings; Settlement; labor courts; unions; case duration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2019-02
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Published in European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer Verlag, 2019, 47 (1), pp.57-58. 〈10.1007/s10657-018-9594-7〉

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-018-9594-7

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