Punishing terrorists in the Spanish Supreme Court: has ideology played any role?

Nuno Garoupa, Fernando Gómez Pomar (), Adrián Segura () and Sheila Canudas ()
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Fernando Gómez Pomar: Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Adrián Segura: Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Sheila Canudas: Universitat Pompeu Fabra

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2023, vol. 56, issue 1, No 1, 21 pages

Abstract: Abstract Traditionally, the conventional views in legal and comparative literature portray civil-law judiciaries as legalistic bureaucracies insulated from political preferences. We investigate decisions on appeal for terrorist actions at the Spanish Supreme Court in the period 2000–2021. Our findings show that ideology (proxied by conservative/progressive affiliation of judges) is a predictor of prodefendant outcomes. Specifically, the results detect a pattern of behavior mediated by panel composition: a more conservative panel is less likely to be prodefendant than a more progressive panel in adjudicating terrorism criminal appeals. These findings confirm previous empirical studies about decisions by the Spanish Supreme Court in other areas of law and provide additional evidence to raise doubts about the conventional literature’s account of civil-law judiciaries.

Keywords: Judicial behavior; Empirical legal studies; Anti-terrorism law; Spanish Supreme Court; Justice rapporteur; Judicial panels; Ideology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-023-09776-7

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