Punishment menus and their deterrent effects: an exploratory analysis

Gilles Grolleau (), Murat C. Mungan () and Naoufel Mzoughi
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Gilles Grolleau: ESSCA School of Management
Murat C. Mungan: Texas A&M University

European Journal of Law and Economics, 2024, vol. 58, issue 1, No 1, 19 pages

Abstract: Abstract Conventional wisdom suggests that allowing offenders to choose alternative punishments to a previously existing punishment cannot enhance deterrence, because offenders can simply select the least costly option available. After reviewing the deterrence research literature, we argue that punishment menus may encourage individuals to focus more on how they construe the wrongdoing and view the ethical gravity of their actions. We experimentally test whether people may perceive punishment menus as more deterrent than stand-alone sanctions available within the same menu. Our results suggest that this is possible, and that changes in people’s perceptions are often mediated by the mindset (e.g., calculative, ethical) they adopt to evaluate punishment schemes as well as their impressions of the seriousness of the illegal act.

Keywords: Behavioral economics; Calculative mindset; Ethical mindset; Economics of crime; Deterrence; Punishment menu (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Working Paper: Punishment Menus and their Deterrent Effects: An Exploratory Analysis (2024)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10657-024-09812-0

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