Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information

Nuno Garoupa

European Journal of Law and Economics, 1999, vol. 7, issue 3, 183-196

Keywords: Economics of crime; optimal sanction; probability of apprehension (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:7:y:1999:i:3:p:183-196

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008738128742

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