On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making

Scott Barret ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 1998, vol. 11, issue 3, 317-333

Abstract: International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Keywords: game theory; international environmental agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008243528330

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