Markets for Tradeable Emission and Ambient Permits: A Dynamic Approach

Y. Ermoliev, M. Michalevich and A. Nentjes

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2000, vol. 15, issue 1, 39-56

Abstract: This paper discusses trade mechanisms in pollutionpermit markets. Proofs are given, that sequential,bilateral trade in tradeable emissions permitsconverges to a market equilibrium with minimal totalcosts of pollution control. If ambient or depositionpermits are traded, the convergence of bilateraltransactions occurs only in the case of a singlereceptor. For multiple receptors, the proof ofconvergence for tradeable emissions and ambientpermits is given for two trade mechanisms: sequential,multilateral trade and a Walrasian auction. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

Keywords: bilateral and multilateral trade; sequential; tradeable emission and ambient permits; Walrasian auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008369611378

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